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Abstract
We study the dynamic Ramsey problem of ﬁnding optimal public debt and linear taxes on
capital and labor income within a tractable inﬁnite horizon model with incomplete markets.
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capital, while a positive amount of public debt is welfare improving. A steady state optimality
condition is derived which implies that the tax on capital is positive, when savings are suﬃciently
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11 Introduction
In this paper we study how the government should tax capital and labor income and issue debt
when individuals face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to their labor income. The purpose of this
paper is to explore the basic principles for optimal linear taxation and debt ﬁnance in a dynamic
incomplete markets model.
This question has been extensively studied in the complete-markets/representative-agent frame-
works,1 but it is still not well understood for the case in which asset markets are incomplete. For
instance, it is often argued that capital should be taxed with incomplete markets, because capital
tends to be ‘over-accumulated’ in such an economy provided that individuals are prudent.2 But
as clariﬁed by Gottardi, Kajii and Nakajima (2009), whether or not capital should be taxed in
an incomplete-markets economy has nothing to do with whether or not its equilibrium savings are
larger than in the ﬁrst-best allocation.
The Ramsey problem of ﬁnding the sequence of values of taxes and debt that allows to ﬁnance a
given ﬂow of government expenditure such that at the associated competitive equilibrium consumers
welfare is maximal needs to be solved explicitly to properly understand the issue. The ﬁrst one to
pose this problem was Aiyagari (1995) in a seminal contribution, where he showed, in a speciﬁc
environment, that if the tax rate on capital income is zero, capital accumulation will be unbounded.3
He also showed, building on this fact, that the tax on capital is positive at an optimal steady state,
where government expenditure is optimally chosen.4 Some important progress has then been made
by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (1998), Domeij and Heathcote (2004), and Conesa,
Kitao and Krueger (2009), among others. Nevertheless, as far as we are aware of, none of these
papers derives a solution of the complete dynamic Ramsey problem, since it is a very diﬃcult task
due to the ‘curse of dimensionality’ inherent in incomplete markets models. Additional simplifying
1See, among others, Stokey and Lucas (1983), Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992), Chari, Christiano, and
Kehoe (1994), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997).
2Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, pp. 535-536) is an example of this type of argument: “(T)he optimal capital
tax in a heterogeneous-agent model with incomplete insurance markets is actually positive, even in the long run. A
positive capital tax is used to counter the tendency of such an economy to overaccumulate capital because of too
much precautionary saving.”
3This result relies, for instance, on the assumption that consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes. As
shown by Marcet, Obiols-Homs, and Weil (2007), when consumption and leisure are imperfect substitutes, capital
accumulation will be bounded even though the interest rate equals the time discount rate.
4This feature, which diﬀers from the public ﬁnance problem considered here and in most of the literature, where
public expenditure is exogenously given, has the important implication that at an optimal steady state the pre-tax
rate of return on capital is equal to the discount factor.
2assumptions are made to derive a solution, which are not innocuous at all. For instance, a typical
assumption made in this literature is that the social planner merely maximizes the average welfare at
the steady state. But then the solution to such a problem ignores the welfare gains/losses during the
transition to the steady state, and can in principle be very diﬀerent from the solution to the Ramsey
problem which takes them into account, as we shall see in our analysis. A signiﬁcant exception in this
regard, among the papers listed above, is Domeij and Heathcote (2004), who analyze the transition
but restrict ﬁscal policies to be such that tax rates are constant over time. As a consequence the
optimal path of government debt, ensuring the optimal intertemporal allocation of the tax burden,
cannot be investigated. More generally, the relationship between optimal taxes and optimal debt
has not been properly analyzed in this literature.
We focus here on a highly stylized model of incomplete markets, in which the optimal taxation
and debt problem can be analyzed in a tractable way. That is, we sacriﬁce the generality of the
model for the completeness of the solution. As a result, we show in a very transparent fashion when
and why capital and labor should be taxed/subsidized, and whether or not the government should
borrow. We derive two general principles about the nature of optimal taxation under incomplete
markets, which are somewhat diﬀerent in nature from the ﬁndings of this literature. Furthermore,
because of the tractability of the model, we obtain a numerical solution to the dynamic Ramsey
problem of ﬁnding the optimal path of taxes and debt without the need to make ad hoc assumptions.
Now we shall outline our ﬁndings. Our model is an incomplete-markets version of the endogenous
growth model studied by Jones and Manuelli (1990), and is closely related to Krebs (2003). Indi-
viduals have access to three types of assets: bonds, physical capital, and human capital. The ﬁrst
two assets are risk-free, but the accumulation of human capital is subject to idiosyncratic shocks.
As in Aiyagari (1995) and the rest of the literature mentioned above, we restrict attention to linear
taxes on labor and capital income.5 Our model diﬀers from the standard one in that there is no
labor/leisure choice and the labor productivity of an individual is determined by his/her investment
in human capital. Nevertheless, it shares some basic properties with the standard macroeconomic
model of incomplete markets (that is, the so-called ‘Bewley model’). First, the capital/labor ratio
in the laissez-faire equilibrium without taxes is greater than the ﬁrst-best level. Second, as shown
in Section 3 of the paper, at the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium with no government purchases
nor taxes a small reduction of capital improves welfare. Hence the capital/labor ratio is too high in
5This is for the sake of tractability and clarity. An important line of future research is to examine how robust our
ﬁndings are when some non-linearities in taxes are allowed, in accord with the information available to the government
over consumers’ trades and characteristics, as in Kocherlakota (2005). Fukushima (2010) considers optimal non-linear
taxation in the model of Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009).
3this sense in our model, as it is in the two-period version of the Bewley model discussed by Davila,
Hong, Krusell, and R´ ıos-Rull (2005).
We investigate the properties of the optimal taxes by considering ﬁrst, in Section 4, the simpler
case where the government expenditure is zero and its budget is balanced in each period. Thus
the level of debt is ﬁxed at zero by assumption. In this case, we show that, when the consumers’
savings and portfolio choices exhibit standard comparative statics properties with respect to prices,
subsidizing the interest income and taxing the wage income makes everyone better oﬀ, at the
laissez-faire equilibrium. That is, the government should increase the capital/labor ratio. This
might appear puzzling at ﬁrst since as argued above the capital/labor ratio is ineﬃciently high,
but there is a simple economic reason: the welfare will be improved if risky income is insured, so
the ﬁrst principle of optimal taxation is that the government should tax risky sources of income
to subsidize less risky sources of income. In our model, it is the labor productivity which is risky,
and taxing the wage income reduces the after-tax price of labor. Under the balanced budget of the
government, the revenue from taxing the wage income is distributed back to the private sector by
subsidizing the interest income. The beneﬁt from this direct insurance eﬀect outweighs a possible
distortion of the capital/labor ratio.
Next we allow the government to borrow and lend and consider the case where public expenditure
is nonzero, setting up the dynamic optimal taxation and debt problem in Section 5. In this problem,
if the government wished to increase the steady state welfare only, the debt level should be large
and negative. So one readily sees that the transition to the steady state must be important. We
ﬁrst show that when government’s consumption is small enough, the government should borrow,6
so a balanced budget is almost never optimal. To understand this result, recall that the optimal
capital tax is negative in the case of a balanced budget without government purchases, and so the
after-tax rate of return on physical capital is greater than its before-tax rate. In addition, because of
risk aversion, the after-tax rate of return on human capital is greater than that on physical capital.
Consequently, the average rate of return in the private sector is greater than that of the government,
i.e., the private sector is “more eﬃcient.” Hence there will be a gain if the government borrows to
reduce taxes at the margin to encourage the private sector to accumulate more wealth.7
How much should then the government borrow and tax at the optimum? To answer this ques-
6We assume that the amount of taxes paid by each individual in a given period depends only on his/her current
labor and capital incomes. This makes our question here well deﬁned. See Bassetto and Kocherlakota (2004) for more
on this issue.
7In our model, in order to determine the optimal allocation of tax burdens, one also needs to take into account
how the timing of taxes aﬀects the saving rate. However, as we shall see, this eﬀect vanishes when evaluated locally
around the equilibrium obtained under the balanced budget restriction.
4tion we derive a condition that the tax rates must satisfy at the steady state of the optimal tax
equilibrium. Roughly speaking, the condition says that under the optimal tax and debt policy,
the rate of return on government debt must be equated with the average return on savings earned
in the private sector, after adjusting for the eﬀect of public debt on the saving rate. Intuitively,
this equality must hold for the tax burdens to be eﬃciently allocated intertemporally since at the
margin, a transfer of wealth from the government to the private sector results in a direct eﬀect of
increasing private sector wealth as well as an indirect eﬀect through a possible change in the saving
rate.
The condition implies in particular, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one
and hence the saving rate is invariant with respect to the rates of return, that there should be
no diﬀerence in the rates of return between the government and the private sector at the steady
state of the optimal tax and debt equilibrium. Since the after-tax rate of return on human capital
must be greater, as argued above, than that on physical capital, the parity of returns holds only
when the tax rate on physical capital is strictly positive. Consequently, the optimal tax rate on
physical capital is strictly positive in the long run. This observation reveals the second principle for
optimal taxation: for eﬃcient intertemporal allocation of tax burdens, the government should tax
the riskless asset in the private sector to keep the returns of the government bond in parity with
the average private sector returns.
Finally we calibrate our model to the U.S. economy in Section 6. Thanks to the tractability of
our model, we are able to obtain a numerical solution to the optimal taxation problem in a relatively
easy way. The parameter for the idiosyncratic income risk is chosen based on the evidence provided
by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), and the rest of the parameters are set as in Chari, Christiano and
Kehoe (1994), with a positive level of government consumption, equal to 18 percent of GDP. We
ﬁnd that the presence of idiosyncratic labor-income risks signiﬁcantly aﬀects the optimal tax rates
and the optimal amount of the government debt. Under our baseline calibration with the coeﬃcient
of risk aversion equal to three, we ﬁnd that both the optimal steady state tax on capital and that
on labor are positive and signiﬁcant, while the optimal level of debt is positive but close to zero.
Also, all the adjustment in ﬁscal policy to reach the steady state is concentrated in one period,
where tax rates are quite high in order to bring down the debt ratio to its steady state level. Also,
we ﬁnd that the welfare gain of adopting the Ramsey policy amounts to a permanent increase in
consumption of all individuals by 0.85 percent. We emphasize that if we only compare the steady
state welfare level, the welfare gain from adopting the Ramsey policy is much higher (8.7 percent),
as the substantial welfare loss that occurs during the transition to the steady state is ignored. This
clearly reveals the importance of taking the transition into account in the analysis.
5Our ﬁnding regarding the optimal debt level are quite sensitive to the degree of relative risk
aversion as well as to the magnitude of the uninsurable risk. For instance, the steady state debt-
output ratio is about -100 percent when the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is one, and it is about 200
percent when the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is 9. Moreover, it is negative and large when there is
no idiosyncratic risk, as in the complete market case.
2 Model economy
In this section we describe the model economy. Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,1,2,....
The economy consists of a government, a continuum of individuals, and perfectly competitive ﬁrms
that produce a single, homogeneous product. There is no aggregate risk in the model and so all
the aggregate variables are non-random. Consequently, the market clearing prices are non-random
throughout. The government needs to purchase an exogenously given amount of output in each
period, which is ﬁnanced by issuing debt and collecting taxes. Regarding taxes, we restrict attention
to linear taxes on wages and interests. Negative taxes (i.e., subsidies) are also allowed. In this section
we describe a competitive equilibrium associated with a given ﬁscal policy. The optimal ﬁscal policy
is discussed later.
2.1 Firms
In each period, a single commodity is produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms, using physical and
human capital as inputs. All ﬁrms have identical production technology, described by a Cobb-
Douglas production function:
y = F(k,h)=Akαh1−α, (1)
where y is the level of output, A is a constant, k is the input of physical capital, and h is the input
of human capital. In particular, there is no productivity shock in the technology.
Let Kt−1 and Ht−1 denote, respectively, the aggregate stock of physical and human capital at
the beginning of period t. Market clearing requires that the quantities of the factors demanded by
the ﬁrms equal to these values. Hence, the aggregate amount of output produced in period t is
therefore given by
Yt = F(Kt−1,H t−1)=AKα
t−1H1−α
t−1 .
The proﬁt maximization condition with market clearing implies that the before-tax rental rate of











There is a continuum of individuals. In every period, individuals consume the consumption good,
supply one unit of raw labor inelastically, and invest in three kinds of assets: risk-free bond, physical
capital, and human capital. The level of human capital of each individual determines the “eﬃciency
units” of his/her labor.
Each individual i ∈ [0,1] has Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences over random sequences of consump-













,t =0 ,1,... (2)
where ui,t is the level of utility of individual i in period t, Et is the conditional expectation operator
at time t, ci,t is his/her consumption in period t, β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, ψ is the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, and γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
Let bi,t−1, ki,t−1 and hi,t−1 denote, respectively, the quantities of risk-free bond, physical capital,
and human capital that individual i holds at the end of period t − 1. To capture the idea that
labor income is subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, we assume that the human capital of
individual i is aﬀected by a random shock parameter, θi,t, at the beginning of each period t.W e
assume that θi,t, i ∈ [0,1], t =1 ,..., are identically and independently distributed across individuals
and across periods, with unit mean. Thus the actual amount of human capital of individual i
available at the beginning of each period t is equal to θi,thi,t−1. We further assume that the law of
large number applies, so that the aggregate stock of human capital at the beginning of period t is






hi,t−1 di = Ht−1.
We suppose that both physical and human capital are accumulated by investing output after
the private shock has been observed; that is, the amount of capital is determined ﬁrst by the time
t shock and then by depreciation, and new investment takes place. Let ιk,i,t and ιh,i,t denote,
respectively, the investment in physical and human capital of individual i in period t. Then the two
types of capital evolve as, for t =1 ,2,...,
ki,t = ιk,i,t +( 1− δk)ki,t−1 (3)
hi,t = ιh,i,t +( 1− δh)θi,thi,t−1 (4)
7where δk and δh are the depreciation rates of physical and human capital, respectively.
We assume that idiosyncratic shocks θi,t are the only sources of uncertainty, hence there is no
aggregate uncertainty in the economy. Consequently, the market returns of production factors are
not random. Both labor and capital income are subject to linear taxes. It follows that the risk-free
bond and physical capital are perfect substitutes and therefore the after-tax rate of return of the
physical capital must be equal to the risk free rate in equilibrium. Let rk,t denote the after-tax
rental rate of physical capital (and hence the risk-free rate), and wt the after-tax wage rate. The
after-tax gross rates of return on the two types of capital are given in equilibrium by:
Rk,t =1− δk + rk,t,
Rh,t =1− δh + wt.
Then the ﬂow budget constraint of individual i is written as, for t =1 ,2,...,
ci,t+ιk,i,t+(1− δk)ki,t−1+ιh,i,t+(1− δh)θi,thi,t−1+bi,t = Rk,tki,t−1+Rh,tθi,thi,t−1+Rk,tbi,t−1 (5)
Individuals may borrow so that bi,t can be negative, but the holdings of capital are non-negative:
ki,t ≥ 0a n dhi,t ≥ 0 are required for all periods and under all contingencies.
Let xi,t be the total wealth of individual i at the beginning of period t after the time t shock
θi,t has been realized: that is,
xi,t ≡ Rk,t(ki,t−1 + bi,t−1)+Rh,tθi,thi,t−1
The amount of borrowing is restricted by the natural debt limit, that prevents consumers from
engaging in Ponzi schemes and in this environment (where the only source of future income is the
revenue from the consumers’ accumulated human and physical capital) takes the following form:
xi,t+1 ≥ 0, (6)
for all periods and at all contingencies.
To sum up, given the initial wealth xi,0 > 0 and a sequence of prices {rk,t,w t}∞
t=0, each individual
i maximizes the lifetime utility ui,0, deﬁned by (2) subject to the ﬂow budget constraints (7) and
the debt limit (6).
This optimization problem can be complex in principle, since individual’s choice variables depend
on the history of shocks and individuals have diﬀerent histories of shocks. But thanks to the
speciﬁcation of the utility function in (2) and in particular its homotheticity property, as well as
the facts that the current wealth is the discounted present value of the future individual income
stream and that shocks are permanent, there is a tractable characterization of the utility maximizing
choices, which we shall summarize below.
8First, equations (3)-(5) can be combined together to obtain:







bi,t + ki,t + hi,t
with initial condition xi,0 > 0. That is, the optimization problem can be equivalently written as
a problem of choosing a sequence of the rate of consumption out of his/her wealth, ηc,i,t,a n dt h e
portfolio between the human capital and the riskless assets (physical capital and risk-free bond),
(ηh,i,t,1−ηh,i,t) per unit of investment for every t =0 ,1,..., given xi,0. By construction, the original
choice values are given iteratively starting with xi,0 from the following equations, t =0 ,1,...:
ci,t = ηc,txi,t
ki,t + bi,t =( 1− ηc,t)(1 − ηh,t)xi,t (8)
hi,t =( 1− ηc,t)ηh,txi,t
As is well known,8 the optimal choice of the portfolio in this type of utility maximization problem
is reduced to a static problem which is independent of all the other choice variables. Speciﬁcally,
deﬁne the certainty-equivalent rate of return ρ associated with the after-tax rental rate rk,a f t e r - t a x
wage rate w, as follows:
ρ(rk,w,η h) ≡
 




It can be shown that at any time period, for any level of initial wealth hence for any individual, an
optimal portfolio is given by a solution to the following maximization problem given the prevailing






Since ρ(r,w,ηh) is strictly concave in ηh, the solution to this maximization problem is unique if it
exists. Given this, it is straightforward to verify that we obtain the following simple characterization
of utility maximization:
Lemma 1. Given a sequence of prices, {rk,t,w t}∞
t=0, for any individual i, a utility maximizing se-
quence of portfolio and rate of consumption are characterized by the following rule: for the portfolio,
8See, for instance, Epstein and Zin (1991), and Angeletos (2007).
9at any time t =1 ,...,

























where ¯ ρt+1, t =0 ,..., denotes the optimized certainty-equivalent rate of return between periods t and
t +1which is






































Notice in particular that since the right hand sides of (11) and (12) are independent of index
i, this result implies that all the individuals in the economy choose the same rate of consumption,
ηc,t, and the same portfolio, ηh,t, in each period in equilibrium. The diﬀerences across individuals
appear in the level of utility, but notice that the level of utility is the level of wealth of the individual
multiplied by a common constant vt.9 Thus in particular, the expected level of utility of a consumer
at any date t is simply his expected level of wealth multiplied by vt, hence to determine his welfare
we only need to ﬁnd the parameter vt and his expected wealth.
Note that from (12) and (15) time t utility per wealth vt and time t consumption share ηc,t are
related as
ηc,t =( 1− β)ψv
1−ψ
t . (16)
Finally, we will need to know how the aggregate supplies of the two capitals change as the
environment changes to study the eﬀects of government policies. Lemma 1 says that the ratio of
the aggregate supplies is determined by a solution to the maximization problem (10). Since ρ is a
9These properties depend on the fact that, as noticed above, consumers have identical homothetic preferences and
their income is given by the revenue from their accumulated wealth, so that a representative consumer exists.
10concave function of ηh, an interior solution for (10) is characterized by the ﬁrst order condition. So
deﬁne Φ : R3
+ → R by the rule:
Φ(rk,w,η h) ≡ E
  




θ(1 − δh + w) − (1 − δk + rk)
  
.
Then Φ(rk,w,η h) = 0 corresponds to the ﬁrst order condition. Especially for comparative static
exercises, we will be concerned with the signs of the derivatives of Φ, which in general depends on
the property of the shock variable. We shall assume the following throughout the analysis.
Assumption 1. For the function Φ:R3
+ → R deﬁned in equation (17), The derivatives of Φ at











∂ηh < 0 readily follows from the concavity of the certainty equivalent function, so the
main part of this assumption is ∂Φ
∂rk < 0a n d∂Φ
∂w > 0. It can be shown that these are satisﬁed when
γ ≤ 1. When γ>1, they hold under appropriate restrictions on the distribution of θi.
These conditions ensure that the consumers’ optimal portfolio choice obtains at an interior
solution for (10) exists and displays the ’normal’ comparative statics properties: ∂ηh,t/∂rk,t+1 < 0
and ∂ηh,t/∂wt+1 > 0.
2.3 Government
The government purchases an exogenously given amount of output, Gt,i ne a c hp e r i o dt.I t i s
ﬁnanced by collecting taxes and issuing debt. Following the common assumption in the literature,
we assume that government purchases do not yield utility to individuals.
Let Bt−1 be the government debt outstanding at the beginning of period t. Denote by τk,t and
τh,t t h ee ﬀ e c t i v et a xr a t e so nt h er e t u r n so fp h y s i c a la n dh u m a nc a p i t a la tt i m et, respectively. For
a given sequence of aggregate stocks, {Kt,H t}
∞
t=0, the ﬂow budget constraint of the government in
period t is given by
Bt + τk,tFk,tKt−1 + τh,tFh,tHt−1 = Gt + Rk,tBt−1, (18)
where the initial stock of debt, B−1,i sg i v e nw i t hB−1 =
  1
0 bi,−1 di .
A ﬁscal policy {τk,t,τ h,t,B t}∞
t=0 is said to be feasible (under {Kt,H t}
∞
t=0) if the ﬂow budget










⎠Bt =0 . (19)
112.4 Competitive equilibrium





0 bi,−1 di,a n dH−1 =
  1
0 hi,−1 di. An allocation is a collection of stochastic processes {ci,t,
xi,t, bi,t, ki,t, hi,t : i ∈ [0,1]}∞
t=0, where for each i, {ci,t, xi,t, ki,t, hi,t}∞
t=0 are stochastic processes
adapted to the ﬁltration generated by the process of idiosyncratic shocks {θi,t}∞
t=0.
Given the initial conditions and a sequence of government purchases, {Gt}∞
t=0,acompetitive
equilibrium is deﬁned by a price system {rk,t,w t}∞
t=0, a ﬁscal policy {τk,t, τh,t, Bt}∞
t=0,a n da n
allocation {ci,t, xi,t, bi,t, ki,t, hi,t : i ∈ [0,1]}∞
t=0 such that: (a) for each i ∈ [0,1] {ci,t,x i,t, ki,t,
hi,t}∞
t=0 solves the utility maximization problem, given the price system; (b) ﬁrms maximize proﬁts
(and the prices faced by consumers reﬂect taxes); that is,
rk,t =( 1− τk,t)Fk(Kt−1,H t−1), and wt =( 1− τh,t)Fh(Kt−1,H t−1),












(c) all markets clear:







0 ci,t di; and (d) the government policy is feasible, that is (18) and (19) hold.
Recall that by Lemma 1, for any equilibrium allocation there is an associated sequence of
{ηct,η ht}
∞
t=0, which is common across all the individuals. For this reason, the aggregate dynamics
of a competitive equilibrium can be succinctly summarized by the average wealth and the sequence
{ηct,η ht}
∞





Then Xt evolves as
Xt+1 = Rx,t+1(1 − ηc,t)Xt,t =0 ,1,2,... (22)
where Rx,t+1 is the equilibrium average rate of return of individual portfolios: for t =0 ,1,2,...
Rx,t+1 ≡ Rk,t+1(1 − ηh,t)+Rh,t+1ηh,t,
=[ 1− δk +( 1− τk,t)Fk,t](1− ηh,t)+[ 1− δh +( 1− τh,t)Fh,t]ηh,t.
12The aggregate amounts of consumption, physical capital and human capital are given, respectively,
as follows: for t =0 ,1,2,...,
Ct = ηc,tXt,
Kt =( 1− ηc,t)(1 − ηh,t)Xt − Bt,
Ht =( 1− ηc,t)ηh,tXt.




ui,t di = vtXt.
2.5 Benchmark equilibrium with no taxes
As a benchmark, let us consider the case in which the government does not purchase goods, and
does not issue debt nor impose any taxes:
Gt = Bt = τk,t = τh,t =0 , for all t ≥ 0, and bi,−1 =0 , for all i ∈ [0,1]. (23)
In this case, the competitive equilibrium has a very simple structure. The aggregate economy is
always on a balanced growth path, although each individual’s consumption ﬂuctuates stochastically
over time.
To see these, ﬁrst notice that in the benchmark economy with (23), from Lemma 1, ηh,t must
maximize the certainty equivalent function ρ where the rates must be consistent with proﬁt max-
imization and market clearing. This means that if we set rk,t = Fk(1 − ηh,t,η h,t)a n dwt =
Fh(1 − ηh,t,η h,t), the ﬁrst-order condition for maximization of ρ must be met: that is, for every
t =0 ,1,2,...,
Φ[Fk(1 − ηh,t,η h,t),F h(1 − ηh,t,η h,t),η h,t]=0 , (24)
where Φ is given in (17). Note that Fk(1,0) = Fh(0,1) = 0 and Fk(0,1) = Fh(1,0) = +∞,a n d
that limηh→0 Fh(1−ηh,η h)h = limηh→1 Fk(1−ηh,η h)(1−ηh) = 0. Furthermore, under Assumption
1, ∂
∂ηhΦ[Fk(1 − ηh,η h),F h(1 − ηh,η h),η h] < 0 whenever Φ = 0, so it follows there exists a unique
ˆ ηh ∈ (0,1) that satisﬁes (24). The uniqueness implies that ηh,t =ˆ ηh must hold for every t.
Set ˆ Fk = Fk(1− ˆ ηh, ˆ ηh), ˆ Fh = Fh(1− ˆ ηh, ˆ ηh), and let ˆ ρ to be the associated certainty-equivalent
rate of return:
ˆ ρ = ρ
 
ˆ Fk, ˆ Fh, ˆ ηh
 
. (25)
The argument above together with Lemma 1 yields the following characterization result.10
10Krebs (2003) derived analogous properties in a similar environment.
13Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, and consider the benchmark economy, satisfying
(23). Let ˆ ηh ∈ (0,1) be the solution to (24), and ˆ ρ be the associated certainty-equivalent rate of
return deﬁned in (25). Then if
βψˆ ρψ−1 < 1,
a unique competitive equilibrium of the benchmark economy exists, generated by ˆ ηh and ˆ ηc ≡ 1 −
βψˆ ρψ−1, which are common across i, through (7) and (8). Thus the aggregate variables Ct, Kt, Ht,
and Xt all grow at the same rate gx, which is given by
ˆ gx ≡ (1 − ˆ ηc) ˆ Rx
where
ˆ Rx ≡ (1 − δk + ˆ Fk)(1 − ˆ ηh)+( 1− δh + ˆ Fh)ˆ ηh










By the uniqueness property established in Proposition 2 it follows that any (interior) competitive
equilibrium must be of the form above. In what follows we refer to this equilibrium of the benchmark
economy without government purchases or taxes as the benchmark equilibrium, and the value of a
variable in the benchmark equilibrium is denoted by a hat (ˆ) over the variable.
3 Constrained ineﬃciency
In this section we consider the allocation attained at the benchmark equilibrium obtained in Section
2.5 and demonstrate that, if a social planner can force individuals to invest less in physical capital
and more in human capital, then all individuals are made better oﬀ. In this sense, the competitive
equilibrium of our benchmark economy is constrained ineﬃcient, as it exhibits over-accumulation
of physical capital.11
Suppose that a social planner can directly pick a deterministic sequence {ηh,t}∞
t=0 of portfolio
compositions. Consider then a hypothetical situation where each consumer is constrained to choose
11The constrained ineﬃciency analysis here is closely related to the one in the previous work by Davila, Hong,
Krusell, and R´ ıos-Rull (2005).
14{ηh,t}∞




,t =0 ,1,2,..., (26)
but all the other variables are determined as in the benchmark equilibrium, namely, by the utility
maximization, proﬁt maximization, and market clearing conditions when there are no government
purchases and no taxes as in (23).
Formally, deﬁne an {ηh,t}∞
t=0-constrained competitive equilibrium as an allocation {ci,t, ki,t, hi,t,
xi,t : i ∈ [0,1]}∞
t=0 and a price system {rk,t,w t}∞
t=0 such that (a) for each i,g i v e n{rk,t,w t}∞
t=1 and
{ηh,t}∞
t=0, {ci,t, ki,t, hi,t, xi,t} solves the utility maximization problem of individual i with the addi-
tional constraint given by (26); (b) prices satisfy rk,t = Fk(Kt−1,H t−1)a n dwt = Fh(Kt−1,H t−1),
where Kt−1 =
  1
0 ki,t−1 di and Ht−1 =
  1
0 hi,t−1 di; and (c) all markets clear.
The benchmark equilibrium is by deﬁnition an {ˆ ηh,t}∞
t=0-constrained equilibrium. We say that
a competitive equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient if there exists no sequence {η 
h,t}∞
t=0 such that all
individuals are better oﬀ in the {η 
h,t}∞




t=0, the associated constrained equilibrium can be constructed as follows, using
Lemma 1. First, market clearing and proﬁt maximization imply
rk,t+1 = Fk(1 − ηh,t,η h,t), and wt+1 = Fh(1 − ηh,t,η h,t). (27)
Next, the certainty-equivalent rate of return between t and t + 1 is given by
ρt+1 = ρ(rk,t+1,w t+1,η h,t),
= ρ(Fk(1 − ηh,t,η h,t),F h(1 − ηh,t,η h,t),η h,t), (28)
where ρ(rk,w,η h) is deﬁned in (9). In our environment, where {ηh,t}∞
t=0 is ﬁxed exogenously, the
consumers’ problem of choosing {ηc,t}∞
t=0 is the same as in the competitive equilibrium. Therefore,
a {ηh,t}∞
t=0-constrained equilibrium is characterized as in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Consider the benchmark economy satisfying (23). Given {ηh,t}∞
t=0,l e t{ρt+1}∞
t=0










, is well deﬁned and takes
a ﬁnite value, then a unique associated constrained equilibrium exists: the prices and the certainty
equivalent rates of return are determined by (27)-(28), and all the other endogenous variables are
determined as in Section 2.4.
For each i and t, consider inﬁnitesimal changes from the portfolio choices ˆ ηh at the benchmark
equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2:
ηh,t =ˆ ηh + dηh,t,
15where dηh,,t may diﬀer across periods and so ηh,t may be time dependent although ˆ ηh is not.
Here we ask whether or not this inﬁnitesimal changes in consumers’ portfolios, {dηh,t},c a n
make all individuals better oﬀ. To answer this question, ﬁrst notice that as shown in Lemma 1 each
individual’s lifetime utility in period 0 is given by
ui,0 = v0xi,0
where






















where ρj+1 is the certainty-equivalent rate of return between periods j and j +1, which is common
for all individuals and given by the expression in (28).
On this basis we can make a few observations. First of all, the lifetime utility of each individual
monotonically increases with the realized certainty-equivalent rate of return in each period: that is,
∂v0
∂ρt+1
> 0, for all t ≥ 0. (29)
Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for every individual i’s welfare to increase is that the certainty-
equivalent rate of return, ρt+1, increases for all t. Secondly, for each t, ρt+1 only depends on ηh,t, as
we see from (28). Thirdly, evaluated at ηh,t =ˆ ηh, ηh,t does not have any ﬁrst-order eﬀect on ρt+1,










Thus, dηh,t aﬀects ρt+1 only through its eﬀect on the equilibrium prices, rk,t+1 and wt+1.T h e
next proposition shows that an increase in ηh,t from the equilibrium value ˆ ηh, dηh,t > 0, makes all
individuals better oﬀ.12
Proposition 4. The competitive equilibrium of the benchmark economy is constrained ineﬃcient.
Reducing the proportion of investment in physical capital improves the welfare of all individuals: for









That is, the benchmark economy exhibits over-accumulation of physical capital in the constrained-
eﬃciency sense.
12The fact that the benchmark equilibrium exhibits time independence is not important for this result. It can be
readily checked even if it were time dependent, the rest of the argument goes through.
16Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that
dρt+1



























Since rk,t+1 = Fk(1 − ηh,t,η h,t)a n dwt+1 = Fh(1 − ηh,t,η h,t) for any ηh,t, from the homogeneity of















=(ˆ ρt+1)γ · E
 






Under the assumption that E(θi,t+1)=1 ,
E
 







Since wt+1 = Fh(1 − ηh,t,η h,t), so
dwt+1









This proposition shows that the ratio of physical capital to human capital is too high in the
benchmark equilibrium: taking the structure of the asset markets as given, reducing the invest-
ment ratio in physical capital is welfare improving. This should not be confused with the simple
observation that the physical-human capital ratio is larger than that in the complete market set-
ting. Indeed, as shown by Hong, Davila, Krusell, and R´ ıos-Rull (2005), and Gottardi, Kajii, and
Nakajima (2009), for some speciﬁcations of the structure of the uncertainty incomplete-markets
economies exhibit a higher level of physical capital than when markets are complete, but still a
welfare improvement can be attained by increasing the level of physical capital.
Proposition 4 has a simple intuition nevertheless: in the benchmark incomplete-market equi-
librium individuals are exposed to too much risk. By changing the portfolio of individuals, ηh,t,
marginally from its equilibrium level, because of the envelope property the planner only aﬀects their
welfare through the eﬀect on market clearing prices, rk,t+1 and wt+1. Now suppose that the planner
increases ηh,t from the equilibrium level, thus raising the rental rate rk,t+1 and reducing the wage
17rate wt+1. Note that the labor income of each individual is subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic
risk, and his/her capital income is not. It follows that such a change in the factor prices reduces the
amount of risk that each individual faces. In this sense, reducing the investment in physical capital
eﬀectively provides some insurance. This is why increasing ηh,t from the equilibrium level achieves
a Pareto improvement in our model economy.
Notice that a similar constrained ineﬃciency result also obtains in a more common environment
where there is no human capital accumulation and the labor productivity of each individual follows
an exogenously speciﬁed stochastic process (see, for instance, Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima (2009)).
4 (Locally) Optimal Taxation
The previous section has shown that at a competitive equilibrium of the economy described with no
government activity (expenditure, taxation or debt), the accumulation of physical capital relative to
that of human capital is ineﬃciently too high. Does this mean that around a competitive equilibrium
the government should tax physical capital (interest income) and subsidize human capital (wage
income) to improve agents’ welfare?
The answer to this question depends on what speciﬁc kind of ﬁscal instruments are available to
the policy maker. In this section we consider the relatively simple case where the government has
balanced budget at all times, thus there is no public debt:
Bt =0 , for all t,a n dbi,−1 =0 , for all i ∈ [0,1]
In this case we show that the answer to the above question turns out to be the opposite: the
government should subsidize capital and tax labor.
For the sake of comparison with the previous section, let us start with the case without govern-
ment purchases:
Gt =0 , for all t.
The balanced budget requirement implies that
τk,tFk,tKt−1 + τh,tFh,tHt−1 =0 , for all t.











τk,t, for all t.
18A competitive equilibrium with balanced budget of the government and no public purchases is
characterized as in Section 2.4 under the additional conditions that Gt = Bt = 0 and ατk,t +( 1−
α)τh,t =0f o ra l lt. Evidently when, in addition, τk,t = τh,t =0f o ra l lt, this is also the benchmark
equilibrium of Section 2.5.
Consider then this equilibrium and examine whether or not changing τk,t from a zero level is
welfare improving for each t. For any pair of tax rates, (τk,τ h), the associated utility maximizing
portfolio ηh(τk,τ h) is deﬁned implicitly as the solution of
Φ[(1− τk)Fk(1 − ηh,η h),(1 − τh)Fh(1 − ηh,η h),η h]=0 , (30)
where the function Φ was deﬁned in (17). Using this function ηh(τk,τ h), the certainty-equivalent
rate of return speciﬁed in (9) can also be written as a function of (τk,τ h):
ρ(τk,τ h) ≡ ρ[rk(τk,τ h),w(τk,τ h)),η h(τk,τ h)], (31)
where
rk(τk,τ h) ≡ (1 − τk)Fk [1 − ηh(τk,τ h),η h(τk,τ h)],
w(τk,τ h) ≡ (1 − τh)Fh [1 − ηh(τk,τ h),η h(τk,τ h)].
Under the balanced budget requirement, ατk +( 1− α)τh = 0, the eﬀect of τk on the after tax



















w h e r ea l ld e r i v a t i v e sa r ee v a l u a t e da tτ = 0. The ﬁrst-term (−Fk) is the direct eﬀect of the change
in the capital-income tax on the after tax return, the second term is the indirect eﬀect due to the
change in prices induced by the change in the agents’ portfolio choice. The following lemma (whose
proof is in the Appendix) shows that the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect.









We can then deﬁne a map yielding the equilibrium value of the coeﬃcient v0 appearing in the
expression of the each individual’s lifetime utility, multiplied by xi,0, as a function of {(τk,t,τ h,t)}∞
t=0:
v0 ((τk,t,τ h,t)}∞




















19where ρ(τk,τ h) is deﬁned in (31). Taxing physical capital is welfare improving if this function is
increasing in τk,t while τh,t is determined to meet the government budget constraint. Interestingly
enough, the following proposition establishes that this is indeed the case and hence that subsidizing
capital makes everyone better oﬀ.
Proposition 6. Suppose that Bt = Gt =0for all t and bi,−1 =0for all i ∈ [0,1]. Suppose also















where dτh/dτk = −α/(1 − α). Therefore, any sequence of taxes {τk,t,τ h,t}∞
t=0 satisfying budget
balance, ατk,t +( 1− α)τh,t =0 , for all t, and such that capital is subsidized, τk,t < 0, and hence
labor is taxed, τh,t = −ατk,t/(1−α) > 0 for every t, improves the welfare of all individuals over the
benchmark equilibrium, if these taxes are small enough.
Proof. In the proof here, unless otherwise stated, all derivatives are evaluated at the benchmark
equilibrium, with zero taxes, τk = τh = 0. Since at such equilibrium the consumption rate ηc,t and
the portfolio choice ηh,t and hence prices are t-invariant, the argument is the same for every t, hence
we shall omit t. Also to simplify the notation, we write d/dτk to denote ∂/∂τk − α/(1 − α)∂/∂τh,
i.e., d/dτk takes into account the induced change in τh via the government budget constraint. Since
the lifetime utility is increasing in ρt for each t, it suﬃces to show that dρ/dτk < 0. Note ﬁrst that
the following relationship holds between the changes in the before tax returns,
dFh
dτk
=( Fhh − Fhk)
dηh
dτk










w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ep r o p e r t y−Fhk + Fhh =( Fkk − Fkh)(1 − ηh)/ηh obtained from the Euler











1 − ˆ ηh
ˆ ηh
+( Fkk − Fkh)


















20so that, by Lemma 5, we have dw





























where the inequality follows from the fact that E[R
−γ
x,θ(θ − 1)] < 0a n ddw/dτk > 0.
The intuition for this result is again very simple. Suppose the government changes marginally
the tax rates, τk and τh from a zero level, under the balanced budget constraint. Due the the
envelope property, such a change in the tax rates only aﬀects the utility of each individual through
its eﬀects on the after-tax factor prices, rk and w. As we have discussed in the previous section,
individuals are exposed to too much risk in their labor income in the benchmark, incomplete-market
equilibrium. In the constrained ineﬃciency result, we have shown that reducing the investment in
physical capital allows to lower this risk by increasing rk and decreasing w. Here, the planner uses
linear taxes rather than directly controlling the portfolios of individuals. By taxing risky labor
income and using the total revenue of this tax to subsidize the riskless return on capital, that is by
setting τh > 0a n dτk < 0, the government can reduce the individual exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
These taxes also aﬀect the agents’ portfolio choice, by increasing the investment in physical capital
relative to that in human capital and hence decreasing the before tax return of physical capital. As
shown in Proposition 6 the ﬁrst eﬀect prevails over the second one so that the overall eﬀect consists
again in an increase in the (after-tax) return rk and a decrease in w. Thus, Proposition 4 and
Proposition 6 are perfectly consistent with each other. They show how, with diﬀerent instruments
available to the planner, a welfare improvement can be attained by reducing the return of the risky
factor and increasing that of the riskless one.
Note that Proposition 6 only characterizes the properties of optimal taxes in a neighborhood
of zero, and does not guarantee that the globally optimal tax rate on physical capital is indeed
negative in the environment considered, where government consumption and debt are zero. A
suﬃcient condition for this to hold is that the map ρ(τk,−α/(1 − α)τk) deﬁned in (31), where we
used the government budget constraint to substitute for τh, has a unique local maximum:13
Assumption 2. The function ρ(τk,−α/(1 − α)τk) has a unique local maximum.
13This property is satisﬁed in all the numerical examples considered in the rest of the paper.
21When Bt = Gt =0f o ra l lt, the optimal tax rates (τk,t,τ h,t)
∞
t=1 are obtained by maximizing
ρ(τk,τ h) in (31) subject to the balanced-budget constraint ατk,t +( 1− α)τh,t = 0. The solution is
naturally time-invariant and under Assumption 2 we can then say that the optimal τk is negative.
5 Optimal taxation and debt
In this section we examine the case where the government can also borrow or lend and study
the dynamic Ramsey problem where the optimal path of taxes and public debt are determined.
With complete markets, Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) have shown that the optimal tax rate on
physical capital is zero in the steady state. In addition, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997) have found
that when there is human capital accumulation in such a model, the optimal tax rates on physical
and human capital are both equal to zero in the steady state. Hence, with positive government
purchases, the optimal level of debt in the steady state is negative.
In this section we investigate how the structure of optimal taxation changes under incomplete
asset markets. We have shown in the previous section that, with incomplete markets, it is in general
beneﬁcial for the government to tax labor and physical capital even if government purchases are
zero. In this section we present two theoretical results on the properties of the solution of the
Ramsey problem, before turning to the numerical analysis of this solution in the next section.
First, accumulating government debt improves welfare as long as government purchases are small
enough. Second, the steady state return on government debt must equal the average rate of return
of private consumers’ portfolios, after adjusting for the eﬀect of public debt on the consumers’
savings rate. Hence, provided the latter eﬀect is not too large, the optimal taxation on physical
capital is strictly positive, whatever the level of government purchases.
5.1 Ramsey problem
The dynamic Ramsey problem consists in maximizing consumers’ welfare at a competitive equilib-
rium, as deﬁned in Section 2.4, across all ﬁscal policies {τk,t,τ h,t,B t}∞
t=0 satisfying (18) and (19),
for a given exogenous sequence of government purchases, {Gt}∞
t=0.
To investigate the solutions of this problem, it is convenient to normalize aggregate variables in














The government’s ﬂow budget constraint can be rewritten as follows, using (22), in terms of these
22normalized variables
gt +( 1− δk + rk,t)bt−1 =( 1− ηc,t−1)Rx,tbt + F(kt−1,h t−1) − rk,tkt−1 − wtht−1
A competitive equilibrium can then be equivalently deﬁned in terms of these normalized variables,
for a given sequence of normalized government purchases, {gt}∞
t=0.
As is standard in the literature, in order to rule out a trivial solution, we assume that the tax
rates in the initial period are exogenously ﬁxed:
τk,0 =¯ τk,0, and τh,0 =¯ τh,0,
together with the initial conditions determining k−1, h−1, b−1. It follows that rk,0, w0,a n db0 are
predetermined as well.
The dynamic optimal taxation and debt problem consists so in the choice of a ﬁscal policy,
implicitly deﬁned by a sequence of normalized debt and net of tax prices {bt+1,r k,t+1,w t+1}∞
t=0, as
well as of all the other endogenous variables {ρt+1,η h,t,η c,t,R x,t+1,k t,h t}∞
t=0 so as to maximize the
consumers’ equilibrium utility level






















subject to the equilibrium constraints which guarantee that the endogenous variables constitute a
competitive equilibrium:





























kt =( 1− ηc,t)(1 − ηh,t) − bt
ht =( 1− ηc,t)ηh,t








(1 − δk + rk,j)





given b−1,k −1, h−1, b0,r k,0, w0. We shall call this maximization problem the Ramsey problem,a n d
the resulting equilibrium the Ramsey equilibrium.
23It is convenient to divide the Ramsey problem into two steps. The ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd, for a
given pair of sequences of debt and rates of consumption, optimal after-tax prices, together with
portfolio choices and average returns such that the associated equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed.
Then these conditionally optimal prices and other variables will be functions of the sequence of debt
and consumption shares. The second step is then to ﬁnd an optimal sequence of debt and consump-
tion shares, taking into account these functional relations, as well as the rest of the equilibrium
conditions.
The ﬁrst step can then be expressed as the problem of maximizing the certainty equivalent
function, given a pair of sequences {bt,η c,t}∞
t=0, for each ﬁxed t:
˜ ρ(bt,b t+1,η c,t) ≡ max
{rk,t+1,wt+1,ηh,t,Rx,t+1}
ρ(rk,t+1,w t+1,η h,t) (34)
subject to
gt+1 +( 1− δk + rk,t+1)bt (35)
=( 1− ηc,t)Rx,t+1bt+1 + F [(1 − ηc,t)(1 − ηh,t) − bt,(1 − ηc,t)ηh,t]
− rk,t+1 [(1 − ηc,t)(1 − ηh,t) − bt] − wt+1(1 − ηc,t)ηh,t
ηh,t =a r gm a x
ηh
ρ(rk,t+1,w t+1,η h)
Rx,t+1 =( 1− δk + rk,t+1)(1 − ηh,t)+( 1− δh + wt+1)ηh,t
Since there is a one-to-one relation between the rate of consumption ηc,t and the utility parameter
vt when utility is maximized (see (16)), the second step can be written as the problem of choosing
{bt+1,η c,t+1,v t+1}∞





subject to the remaining equilibrium conditions
v
ψ−1





ρt+1 =˜ ρ(bt,b t+1,η c,t) (38)
and (16).
Regarding the function ˜ ρ(b,b ,η c) deﬁned in (34), the following simple observation is useful.
Lemma 7. Assume that gt+1 =0 . Consider the function ˜ ρ(b,b ,η c) deﬁned in (34). If b = b  =0 ,
the ﬁrst order eﬀect of v is zero everywhere: that is,
∂˜ ρ
∂ηc
=0 , if b = b  =0 .
24Proof. When gt+1 = 0 and bt = bt+1 = 0, taking advantage of the homogeneity of F, the ﬁrst
equation in the constraints for the maximization problem (34) becomes 0 = F [(1 − ηh,t),η h,t] −
rk,t+1(1 − ηh,t) − wt+1ηh,t.T h u s t h e v a r i a b l e ηc,t no longer appears in any of the constraints. So
the value of the objective function remains unchanged when ηc,t changes, thus establishing the
result.
5.2 Desirability of government debt
Before discussing the solution to the Ramsey problem, we examine the welfare eﬀects of issuing
government debt, when markets are incomplete. We show that, starting from a zero level of govern-
ment debt, increasing the amount of government debt is welfare improving as long as government
purchases are small enough.
Consider the Ramsey problem under the additional restriction
bt = gt =0 , for all t,
that is, there is no government debt nor expenditure. The variables solving the Ramsey problem
under these conditions, as argued in Section 4, are time invariant. Let us denote them with the
superscript o,t h a ti s ,vo,ρ o, Ro
x, Fo








c =( 1− β)ψ (vo)
1−ψ
where ρo =˜ ρ(0,0,ηo
c).
We investigate whether allowing for an arbitrarily small (positive or negative) level of debt at
only one date yields a welfare improvement. Consider the Ramsey problem under the alternative
restriction
bT+1 = ¯ bT+1, and bt =0f o ra l lt  = T +1 ,gt =0 , for all t. (39)








ρt+1(¯ bT+1)=˜ ρ(bt,b t+1,η c,t(¯ bT+1))
ηc,t(¯ bT+1)=( 1− β)ψ  
vt(¯ bT+1)
 1−ψ
25with bt =0f o ra l lt  = T + 1. Notice that
vt(¯ bT+1)=vo, ∀t ≥ T +2 , (41)
ρt(¯ bT+1)=ρo, ∀t  = T +1 ,T+2
where the second equality follows from Lemma 7 and the ﬁrst one from (15).
The next proposition states that having a positive amount of debt, ¯ bT+1 > 0, is welfare improving
as long as government purchases are suﬃciently small. Its proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 8. Suppose that gt = g for all t, and that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Consider the
optimal tax equilibrium under the balanced budget requirement: bt =0for all t. Then increasing ¯ bT+1
from zero for a given period T +1improves the lifetime utility of all individuals if g is suﬃciently
small.
To obtain an intuition for this result note, in the light of equation (33), that whether or not
increasing ¯ bT+1 from zero is welfare improving depends on how this change aﬀects the equilibrium
values of {ρt+1}∞
t=0. As shown in the previous section, in an optimal tax equilibrium, for any pair
of sequences {bt,η c,t}∞
t=0 we have ρt+1 =˜ ρ(bt,b t+1,η c,t), with the map ˜ ρ(.) obtained as solution of
problem (34). In addition, when bt = bt+1 = 0 by Lemma 7 ˜ ρ is locally independent of ηc,t.T h i s
greatly simpliﬁes the argument, as we only have to look at the partial derivatives of ˜ ρ(bT,b T+1,η c,T)
and ˜ ρ(bT+1,b T+2,η c,T+1) with respect to ¯ bT+1 evaluated at bT = ¯ bT+1 = bT+2 = 0 and the optimal
tax equilibrium value with bt = gt =0f o ra l lt, ηc,T = ηc,T+1 = ηo





2 measures the beneﬁt in T + 1 of increasing the government debt, primarily
due to the associated tax cut, while ρo
1 measures the cost of the increase in taxes in period T +2
that is required to redeem bT+1.T h ev a l u eo f ¯ bT+1 enters the constraints of problem (34) via the
government budget constraint (35), which by the homogeneity of F(k,h) can be rewritten when
gt =0a s
(1 − δk + Fk)bt =( 1− ηc,t)Rx,t+1bt+1
+( Fk,t+1 − rk,t+1)(1 − ηc,t)(1 − ηh,t)+( Fh,t+1 − wt+1)(1 − ηc,t)ηh,t
where Fk,t+1 = Fk((1−ηc,t)(1−ηh,t)−bt,(1−ηc,t)ηh,t), and Fh,t+1 = Fh((1−ηc,t)(1−ηh,t)−bt,(1−
ηc,t)ηh,t). Hence we see that the beneﬁt of the (marginal) increase in ¯ bT+1, ρo
2, is proportional to
the after-tax average rate of return of individual portfolios, Ro
x, at the optimal tax equilibrium with
bt = gt =0f o ra l lt. This is natural because Ro
x is the average rate that individuals earn using the
proceeds from the tax cut in T +1. The cost incurred in period T +2 when the debt ¯ bT+1 is repaid,
26ρo
1, is then proportional to the (before-tax) rate of return on government debt, 1−δk+Fo
k.W h e t h e r
or not increasing ¯ bT+1 is beneﬁcial depends on the comparison between these two terms. In fact,
we show in the proof that the beneﬁt of increasing ¯ bT+1 dominates over its cost if and only if
Ro
x > 1 − δk + Fo
k. (42)
The reason why (42) holds is simple. As discussed in Section 4, under Assumptions 1 and 2 the
optimal tax rates when bt = gt =0f o ra l lt satisfy τo
k < 0a n dτo
h > 0. Note also that, since the
investment in the human capital is risky, the after-tax rate of return on human capital is greater
than the after-tax rate of return on physical capital. Hence we have
Ro
x =[ 1− δk +( 1− τo
k)Fo
k](1− ηo




> 1 − δk +( 1− τo
k)Fo
k
> 1 − δk + Fo
k
establishing (42) and showing that increasing the amount of government debt in one period is welfare
improving. The argument can then be extended by continuity to the case where gt = g for all t for
g suﬃciently small.
Notice that the desirability of public debt we ﬁnd is not due to the provision of liquidity em-
phasized by Aiyagari McGrattan (1998), as in our set-up the borrowing constraint never binds.
5.3 Ramsey steady state
We focus here on the properties of the Ramsey equilibrium, obtained as a solution of (33) at a
steady state, i.e., along a balanced growth path.14
Consider the optimal choice of bt+1, that is, the (normalized) amount of government debt issued
in period t+1, keeping bs ﬁxed for all s  = t+1, determined in the second-step problem (36). Look
at problem (34) and consider the eﬀects of changing bt+1 at an optimal solution. Note ﬁrst that bt+1
does not aﬀect {ρj}
∞
j=t+3 and hence neither vs for s ≥ t+2 since, as we see in (15), vt is determined
by the future values of ρt. The direct eﬀect of bt+1 is to change ρt+1 and ρt+2 and hence vt and
vt+1 and also ηc,t and ηc,t+1. By the envelope theorem vs for s ≤ t − 1, in particular v0, are only
aﬀected by the change in bt+1 because vt and vt+1 are aﬀected. The eﬀects of an increase in bt+1 are
then summarized as follows. (i) First, it increases ρt+1 because an increase in the government debt
14A presumption here is that a solution to the Ramsey problem converges to a steady state. We do not have a
formal proof for this, but in all the numerical results reported later, such a convergence takes place in just one period.
Note also that we use the terms “steady state” and “balanced growth path” interchangeably given the fact that a
steady state for the normalized variables corresponds to a balanced growth path of the economy.
27issued in period t + 1 implies a reduction in the tax rates in that period. This is a beneﬁt of the
increase in bt+1; (ii) Second, it reduces ρt+2 because the increase in bt+1 requires an increase in the
tax rates in the next period, t +2 .T h i si sac o s to ft h ei n c r e a s ei nbt+1. (iii) Finally, the change in
bt+1 may also aﬀect the saving rates ηc in periods t + 1 and t + 2. A change in the saving rate also
aﬀects the certainty-equivalent rates of return. The ﬁrst two eﬀects are analogous to those found
in the previous section, the third one arises here, where debt levels may be nonzero.
Optimality requires, of course, that the marginal eﬀect of a change in bt+1 on vt and vt+1 must
be zero. The next proposition (whose proof is in the Appendix) shows that, at the steady state,
this condition is characterized by a relatively simple equation.
Proposition 9. In the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium the following condition holds:
Rx =( 1− δk + Fk)
 





∂ηc,w h e r e˜ ρ is the function deﬁned in (34).
An intuition for this result is given as follows. As shown in the proof, at the steady state, the
ﬁrst-order condition for an optimal value of bt+1,a ta n yt, becomes
ρ2 +
βψ˜ ρψ−1
1 − βψ˜ ρψ−2 (1 − ψ)ρηcηc
ρ1 =0 , (44)
where ρ2 ≡ ∂
∂b  ˜ ρ(b,b ,η c), ρ1 ≡ ∂
∂b˜ ρ(b,b ,η c), both evaluated at b  = b. This equation shows the
three eﬀects on ρt and hence on vt of a change in the value of bt+1 which were described in
the previous paragraph. The ﬁrst term, ρ2, represents the beneﬁcial eﬀect on ρt and hence also
on vt of an increase in bt+1 (eﬀect i); ρ1 in the second term describes its cost (eﬀect ii), while
(1 − βψ˜ ρψ−2 (1 − ψ)ρηcηc)−1 is the eﬀect due to the change in the saving rate (eﬀect iii). Finally,
the factor βψ˜ ρψ−1 in the second term represents the eﬀective discount factor (see (37)).






1 − δk + Fk
. (45)
Also, at the steady state the savings rate satisﬁes 1−ηc = βψ˜ ρψ−1. Then, combining (44) and (45)
yields (43).
Condition (45) allows us to relate the beneﬁcial eﬀect (i) and the costly eﬀect (ii) previously
identiﬁed to, respectively, Rx, the average rate of return earned in the private sector, and 1−δk+Fk,
the rate of return for the government (that is, the before-tax rate on the risk free asset). Thus, the
steady-state condition (43) says that, after adjusting for the change in the saving rate, the rates of
return earned by the private sector and by the government should be equal at the steady state.





and ηc,t is a constant irrespective of the sequence of market rates:
ηc,t =1− β
So in this case there is no eﬀect due to a change in the saving rate, so (43) reduces to the equality
between the average private rate and the before tax return on physical capital. More importantly,
this equation implies that the steady-state tax rate on physical capital is positive in our incomplete-
market economy.
Corollary 10. Consider the case of ψ =1 . Then, in the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium,
the following condition holds:
Rx =1− δk + Fk (47)
It implies that the optimal tax rate on physical capital at the steady state is positive:
τk > 0
Proof. Condition (47) immediately follows from (43) since ρηc =0w h e nψ = 1. To see that τk > 0,
notice that because of risk aversion, the rate of return on human capital must be greater than the
rate of return of the risk-free assets. That is,
1 − δk + rk <R x < 1 − δh + w
This inequality, together with (47), implies then that
τk > 0.
Corollary 10 can be directly related to the previous results obtained by Judd (1985), Chamley
(1986), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), among others, which show that with complete markets
the optimal tax rate on physical capital at the steady state is zero. In our setup, if shocks to human
capital of individuals were perfectly insurable (at fair prices) so that human capital were also,
eﬀectively, a riskless asset, all three assets (risk-free bonds, physical capital, and human capital)
would yield the same rate of return, that is,
1 − δk + rk =1− δh + w = Rx
29It would then follow from (47) that
τk =0 .
Aiyagari (1995) also found that the optimal tax on capital is positive at a steady state when
markets are incomplete. His model however is such that τk must be positive for a steady state
where the level of government expenditure is optimally chosen to exist. In our model in contrast
the optimal value of τk is primarily determined by the comparison of costs and beneﬁts of varying
the level of public debt.
6 Numerical result
In this section we calibrate our model based on some empirical evidence on the U.S. economy, and
examine how market incompleteness aﬀects the structure of Ramsey taxation and debt.
6.1 Baseline calibration
Suppose that θi,t ∈{ 1+¯ θ,1 − ¯ θ}, each occurring with equal probability. Also, suppose that the
normalized amount of government purchases is constant over time, gt = g for all t. Then the set
of parameters of our model economy is given by {β,ψ,γ,A,α,δk,δ h,g,¯ θ}. The baseline values for
these parameters are set as follows. First, we set ψ = 1 and γ = 3, that is, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is unity, and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is three. Second, the
capital share of income is set to 0.36, and the depreciation rates of physical and human capital are
both 0.06: α =0 .36 and δk = δh =0 .06. The values for the remaining parameters and for the
ﬁscal policy τk,t = τh,t = τ and bt = b for all t are then set so that, at a balanced growth path,
the following features of the U.S. economy are replicated: (i) government purchases are 18 percent
of GDP; (ii) government debt is 51 percent of GDP; (iii) the capital-output ratio is 2.7; (iv) the
growth rate of GDP is 1.6 percent; (v) the variance of the permanent shock to individual labor
earnings is 0.0313. The ﬁrst four facts are based on Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994), the last
one on Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).15 The baseline parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
6.2 Results
Table 2 shows the tax rates and the government debt at the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium.
For reference, the ﬁrst column shows the corresponding values when the parameter values of the
economy and the ﬁscal policy are set at the baseline levels reported in Table 1, with a (uniform) tax
15It is also consistent with the evidence reported by Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004).
30rate of 19.95 percent yielding a debt-to-output ratio of 51 percent and a growth rate of 1.6 percent,
which are as we said the values calibrated to the U.S. economy. The second column describes the
corresponding values at the Ramsey steady state, that is with the optimal ﬁscal policy, still for the
baseline calibration of the economy. The third column reports the values at a Ramsey steady state
when government purchases are zero.
As shown in Corollary 10, the tax rate on capital at the Ramsey steady state is strictly positive.
Quantitatively, we see the optimal value of the tax is a non trivial amount even when there are no
government purchases. The wage tax rate at the Ramsey steady state is also positive. As shown in
Proposition 6, taxing the wage income is beneﬁcial because it allows to reduce the idiosyncratic risk
that individuals face. Finally, we see that the level of government debt at the Ramsey steady state
is close to zero (0.19 percent of GDP). To better understand this ﬁnding, it is useful to compare
it with the value obtained in the last column, when g = 0. In this case we see that the debt-to-
output ratio at the Ramsey steady state is positive and fairly large (202.6 per cent of GDP). This
is in accord with the results of Proposition 8 showing the beneﬁts of issuing debt when government
purchases are close to zero. In contrast, when g is positive the optimal debt level at the steady
state with complete markets is negative, as recalled in Section 5. Hence with incomplete markets
these two forces push in opposite direction, which explains the much lower, but still non negative
optimal level of debt reported in the second column.
The tractable nature of the model considered allows us to ﬁnd also the transitional dynamics
of the Ramsey equilibrium and not just the steady state. This dynamics is illustrated in Figure
1, which plots the debt-to-output ratio, bt/yt, and the two tax rates, τk,t and τh,t,i nt h eR a m s e y
equilibrium, that is at a solution of (33) when the initial condition for the ﬁscal policy parameters
sets their values b0,τ k,0,τ h,0 at a level equal to their baseline levels of Table 1. We see from the
ﬁgure that the dynamics turns out to be quite simple. The adjustment in the ﬁscal policy only lasts
one period, in which we see a spike in both tax rates which allows to bring down the debt ratio at
date 1, b1/y1, to its Ramsey steady state level. After this ﬁrst period also the tax rates are set at
their new steady state level and the economy reaches immediately the steady-state for the Ramsey
equilibrium and stays on the balanced growth path afterwards. It proves then to be optimal that all
the adjustment in the ﬁscal policy is concentrated in one period, to minimize distortions over time.
The fact then that the transition to the new steady state of the equilibrium variables is immediate
clearly depends on the speciﬁc features of the economy considered, in particular its technology.
How much beneﬁts do individuals in our economy obtain by moving from the baseline policy to
the Ramsey policy? This beneﬁt can be measured by the rate of permanent increase in consumption
of each individual that makes him/her indiﬀerent between the two policies. Note that, as can be
31seen in Lemma 1, this rate is the same for all consumers and is given by the ratio of the values
of v0 under the two policies in comparison. Table 3 shows the result. When we only compare the
steady state associated with the baseline policy and the Ramsey policy, the welfare gain of adopting
the Ramsey policy amounts to an increase of about 8.7 percent in each individual’s consumption.
But this number ignores the cost of transition, where the signiﬁcant increase in taxes takes place.
When the transition is taken into account, the gain gets substantially smaller, 0.85 percent, which
is nevertheless a signiﬁcant amount.
6.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we conduct some sensitivity analysis. Speciﬁcally, we examine how the debt-to-output
ratio and the tax rates at the Ramsey steady state vary under diﬀerent values for the risk aversion
γ, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ, and the idiosyncratic risk ¯ θ. For the purpose of
normalization, when we change the values of these parameters, we adjust the value of the discount
factor β so that the steady-state growth rate under the baseline policy continues to be equal to 1.6
percent.
Figure 2 plots the results for the changes in risk aversion. We see that the steady-state debt-
to-output ratio is very sensitive to the choice of the degree of risk aversion. It is about −100
percent when γ = 1, and about 200 percent when γ = 9. Regarding the tax rates, the risk aversion
coeﬃcient aﬀects the capital tax rate τk much more than the labor tax rate τh.
Figure 3 then shows how the Ramsey steady state is aﬀected by the magnitude of the idiosyn-
cratic risk. Again, the steady-state debt-to-output ratio varies a lot. It is negative and large (−200
percent) when there is no idiosyncratic risk (std(θ) = 0), in accord with the ﬁndings mentioned
above from the complete market literature. The debt ratio then gets larger when the risk increases,
reaching a zero level when std(θ) is near its baseline level, 0.1585, and a positive level of about 60
percent when std(θ)=0 .2. The two tax rates are very similar when the amount of idiosyncratic
risk is moderate (std(θ) < 0.1), but when it gets large (std(θ) > 0.1), the labor tax rate τh becomes
much less sensitive to the change in the amount of idiosyncratic risk. Most of the increase in the
steady state level of debt is then ﬁnanced with an increase in τk.
In contrast to risk aversion and the amount of idiosyncratic risk, the value of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution does not aﬀect the Ramsey steady state much, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Any eﬀect that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution has on the Ramsey steady state is oﬀset
by the change in the value of β needed for the normalization purpose (to keep the growth rate under
the baseline policy unchanged).
327 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a tractable inﬁnite horizon model and examined the optimal tax
of labor and capital as well as the optimal path of debt when there are uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks to the labor income. Our results can be summarized by the two general principles for public
policy in the presence of idiosyncratic income risks. That is, (i) design taxes so as to increase the
degree of insurance provided against the idiosyncratic risks; (ii) allocate the tax burdens eﬃciently
over time. In the environment considered, the ﬁrst principle calls for taxing risky labor income, the
second for issuing debt and taxing capital income.
For the sake of tractability and clarity, we have made a number of simplifying assumptions in
this paper. As we noted in Introduction, the Ramsey problem is diﬃcult to solve in general, so we
contend that the beneﬁt from deriving an explicit solution exceeds the cost of loss of generality. We
readily admit however that our results might be sensitive to these assumptions, and it is important
to examine the robustness of our ﬁndings in more general environments.
We conclude by brieﬂy discussing two generalizations of the analysis. The ﬁrst one concerns
our present focus on linear taxes. This is in line with most of the literature on Ramsey taxation.
Allowing for non-linear taxes clearly expands the set of tax equilibria, at the same time raises the
issue of what is the information available to the government on consumers’ trades, that determines
which forms of non-linearity of taxes can be implemented. With taxes exhibiting quite strong forms
of non-linearity the ﬁrst best can be attained, however their informational requirements are quite
strong. Thus we speculate that our ﬁndings would have some counterpart when taxes exhibiting
more limited forms of non-linearity are available for the government.
The second extension regards the role of income distribution. In our model, each individual’s
lifetime utility is given by ui,0 = v0xi,0,w h e r exi,0 is his/her wealth in period 0 and v0 is a constant
common across all individuals. The optimal tax and debt policy is the one that allows to attain the
highest possible value for this common constant v0, hence the income inequality has no eﬀect on
the optimal policy. In more general environments taxes also change the income distribution across
the households, and their welfare eﬀects may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of consumers. It is then
an important task to generalize the analysis to address this important question.
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35Table 1: Baseline parameter values
parameter value description
ψ 1 intertemporal elasticity of substitution
γ 3 risk aversion coeﬃcient
A 0.315 coeﬃcient in the production function
α 0.36 share of capital
δk 0.06 depreciation rate of physical capital
δh 0.06 depreciation rate of human capital
β 0.9511 discount factor
g 0.0256 government purchases as a fraction of total wealth
τ 0.1955 tax rate in the baseline policy (τk,t = τh,t = τ)
¯ θ 0.1585 idiosyncratic shock
Table 2: Steady states
model notation baseline Ramsey Ramsey with g =0
capital tax rate (%) τk 19.95 19.64 11.56
labor tax rate (%) τh 19.95 14.88 4.99
debt-GDP ratio (%)
Bt−1
Yt 51 0.19 202.6
growth rate (%)
Yt+1
Yt − 1 1.6 2.26 3.25
Table 3: Welfare gain of adopting the Ramsey policy
ignoring transition considering transition
8.7320 0.8494

























Figure 1: Transitional dynamics.
























Figure 2: Diﬀerent values of risk aversion.

























Figure 3: Diﬀerent values of the idiosyncratic risk.




























Figure 4: Diﬀerent values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
408 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5
In this proof, all derivatives are evaluated at the competitive equilibrium with zero taxes, τk = τh =
0, unless otherwise stated. First notice that
drk
dτk






















































The last inequality follows from the fact that Fk > 0, fη < 0, −Fkk + Fkh > 0, fr < 0a n dfw > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8
As shown in the text, (41) holds. Using then also (15) we see that to determine the eﬀect of ¯ bT+1







For this, let us ﬁrst see how bT+1 aﬀects ηc,T+1 and hence, given (38), vT+1. Recall that
vT+1(¯ bT+1)=
 
(1 − β)ψ + βψρT+2(¯ bT+1)ψ−1vT+2(¯ bT+1)ψ−1
  1
ψ−1 , (50)
ρT+2(¯ bT+1)=˜ ρ(¯ bT+1,0,η c,T+1(¯ bT+1)) and ηc,T+2(¯ bT+1)=ηo









41Diﬀerentiating vT+1 with respect to ¯ bT+1 in (50) and evaluating it at ¯ bT+1 = 0 yields (since by (41)






1 ≡ ∂˜ ρ(b,0,ηo
c)/∂b evaluated at b =0 .
Next, look at the equation analogous to (50) for date T:
vT(¯ bT+1)=
 
(1 − β)ψ + βψ  
ρT+1(¯ bT+1)
 ψ−1 vT+1(¯ bT+1)ψ−1
  1
ψ−1 (52)
and diﬀerentiate vT with respect to ¯ bT+1. This derivative, when evaluated at ¯ bT+1 = 0, using (51)
and the fact that at this value we have
∂ρT+1












2 ≡ ∂˜ ρ(0,b  ,ηo
c)/∂b  evaluated at b  =0 .
Now remember the deﬁnition of the function ˜ ρ(b,b ,η c) in problem (34). Let λ(b,b ,η c) denote
the Lagrange multiplier on the ﬂow budget constraint for the government in that maximization
problem. Let ηh(b,b ,η c), rk(b,b ,η c), w(b,b ,η c), and Rx(b,b ,η c) denote its solution, and deﬁne
Fk(b,b ,η c) ≡ Fk[(1 − ηc)(1 − ηh(b,b ,η c)) − b,(1 − ηc)ηh(b,b ,η c)].
Then, using the envelope property, since b,b  only appear in constraint (35) of this problem,
∂˜ ρ
∂b
= −λ(b,b ,η c)
 




∂b  = λ(b,b ,η c)(1− ηc)Rx(b,b ,η c).
Hence, in the optimal tax equilibrium under the constraint bt = gt =0f o ra l lt, we have16
ρo












x − (1 − δk + Fo
k)], (53)
16To better understand the form of these expressions, notice that, as we see from (35), a marginal increase of ¯ bT+1
relaxes this constraint at T + 1 yielding a gain of λ
o (1 − ηc)Rx, while tightening this constraint at T +2w i t hal o s s
of λoβ
ψ(ρo)
ψ−1(1 − δk + F
o
k). Since (1 − ηc)=β
ψ(ρo)
ψ−1, the comparison of these two reduce to the comparison
between Rx and (1 − δk + F
o
k).
42where ξ is a positive constant deﬁned by
ξ ≡ βψ(ρo)ψ−1λoβψ(ρo)ψ−1 > 0.
That ξ>0 follows from the fact that λo > 0, which is shown at the end of this proof.
U n d e rA s s u m p t i o n s1a n d2 ,a sa r g u e di nS e c t i o n4 ,w eh a v e
τo
k < 0.
Because the investment in human capital is risky, its expected return must be greater than the rate
of return on physical capital:
1 − δk +( 1− τo
k)Fo





x =[ 1− δk +( 1− τo
k)Fo
k](1− ηo




> 1 − δk +( 1− τo
k)Fo
k
> 1 − δk + Fo
k (54)
From (53) and (54) it follows that dv0
d¯ bT+1 > 0a tg = 0. By continuity, this is also the case with
a suﬃciently small g.
It remains then to show that λo > 0. Consider problem (34) under the constraint bt = gt =0





F(1 − ηh,η h) − rk(1 − ηh) − wηh =0 ,
Φ(rk,w,η h)=0 ,
where Φ(rk,w,η h)=∂ρ(rk,w,η h)/∂ηh as deﬁned in (17). Let λo and μo be the Lagrange multipliers
for these two constraints, respectively. Then the ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂ρo
∂rk















k − wo)=0 .
43where the superscript o indicates, as before, variables evaluated at a solution of the Ramsey problem




h)+( wo − Fo
h)ηo


















Here, note that: (i) ρo
rk > 0, which follows from the deﬁnition of ρ(rk,w,η h) and the fact that
ηo





> 0, under Assumption 1; and (iii) ro
k−Fo
k > 0, under Assumption 2. Therefore,
λo > 0.
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t+2 =0 , (55)
where ˜ ρt+1 ≡ ˜ ρ(bt,b t+1,η c,t), ρ2,t+1 ≡ ∂˜ ρ(bt,b t+1,η c,t)/∂bt+1,a n dρ1,t+2 ≡ ∂˜ ρ(bt+1,b t+2,η c,t+1)/∂bt+1.
















t+1 =0 , (56)
where ρηc,t+2 ≡ ∂˜ ρ(bt+1,b t+2,η c,t+1)/∂ηc,t+1.






ρ1 = 0 (57)












Now notice that from the deﬁnition of ˜ ρ(b,b ,η c) in (34), the derivative of ˜ ρ with respect to b and b 
is given by the derivative of the ﬁrst constraint times the corresponding multiplier. Then it follows





1 − δk + Fk
(1 − ηc)Rx
=
1 − δk + Fk
βψ˜ ρψ−1Rx
, (59)
44where for the second equality, we used again (16), ηc =( 1− β)
ψ v1−ψ, and (38), vψ−1 =( 1− β)
ψ +
βψ˜ ρψ−1vψ−1, from the constraints of (36).
Combining (57)-(59) and using again ηc =( 1− β)
ψ v1−ψ, yields
Rx =( 1− δk + Fk)
 
1 − (1 − ψ)βψ˜ ρψ−2˜ ρηcηc
 −1
(60)
This completes the proof of Proposition 9.
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